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Constitutional Law
The Enduring Constitution of the Peoph
by Robert A. Sedler
he most salient features of the
Constitution of the United
States are that it is a "people's
constitution," a constitution that con-
tains sweeping limitations on govern-
mental power designed to protect in-
dividual rights, and a constitution that
is "intended to endure." The preamble begins, "We the
People of the United States," and the Constitution that
emerged from the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was
submitted to the "People of the United States" for rati-
fication. Once ratified, it established a structure of con-
stitutional governance for the nation now known as the
United States of America. In American constitutional
theory then, the Constitution is deemed to emanate from
the "People of the United States.''1 , _
At the time of ratification, the "People of
the United States" consisted primarily of
white male property owners, since they were
the only persons at that time with the right to
vote. With adoption of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, black
Americans became a part of the "People of the
United States," within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, and with the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, so did women. Under the Supremacy
Clause of Art. VI, sec. 2, this Constitution,
emanating from the "People of the United
States," is the "Supreme Law of the Land,"
and every exercise of governmental power is subject to
the constraints of the Constitution. In this sense, the
"People of the United States" are "supreme" over their
government.
While the Constitution gave enumerated powers to
the newly-formed federal government and allocated
powers among its three branches, it also, in some of its
original provisions and in the Bill of Rights soon added
sweeping limitations on governmental power, designed
to protect individual rights.2
It is the individual rights provisions of the Constitu-
tion that have had the most profound impact on the life
of this Nation. Whenever any governmental body -
federal, state or local - enacts any law or takes any ac-
tion, it must take account of the limitations on govern-
mental power, designed to protect individual rights, that
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the "People of the United States" have placed in their
Constitution. The People have said in their Constitution
that individual rights shall be protected against govern-
mental action, and the overriding principle of the struc-
ture of governance established by the Constitution may
properly be said to be that the power of government must
be limited in order to protect individual rights.
Many of the Constitution's limitations on govern-
mental power, as reflected in the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, are broadly phrased and
open-ended. The Bill of Rights reads like a political
exhortation addressed to all
branches of the federal govern-
ment - Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the Judiciary - a long list of "Thou Shall
Nots." A number of these are expressed in majestic
generalities, such as the entire First Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provision, and
the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Others are
broadly phrased in various levels of generality, while still
others relate to certain abuses of the colonial era, such
as the Fifth Amendment's requirement of grand jury
indictment.
More significant, perhaps, than the particular guar-
antees themselves is the total effect of the Bill of Rights.
It is sweeping in its prohibitions, quantitatively and
qualitatively, and the limitations it imposes are exten-
sive and overlapping in their totality.
As lawyers accustomed to working with the Consti-
tution as a legal document, we tend to assume that the
Constitutional Law
and the Protection of Individual Rights
framers wanted to embody a distinct legal mean-
ing in all of the Constitution's provisions. A
reading of the language of the Bill of Rights in-
dicates that this assumption may be unwar-
ranted. It is much more reasonable to con-
clude that the framers' primary concern was
not how (or if) lawyers and judges would
fashion constitutional doctrine from the
Bill of Rights. Rather it seems that al-
though the Bill of Rights analytically was
a legal document, the framers' major ob-
jective was to convey a
political message
as strongly as they could: The power of the government
must be limited in order to protect individual rights.
We must also remember that the sweeping limita-
tions on governmental power in the Bill of Rights were
not adopted on the assumption that the federal judiciary
would define these limitations and would enforce them
against the Congress and the President. It is not at all
clear that the framers contemplated judicial review -
at the time of the promulgation of the Bill of Rights,
Marbury v Madison3 was more than a decade away -
but even if they did, they did not adopt the Bill of Rights
to enable the judiciary to check the exercise of power
by the other branches. Rather, the framers were trying
to establish the overriding principle that the power of
the government must be limited in order to protect in-
dividual rights, and they accomplished their goal by im-
posing a host of limitations on governmental power, a
number of which were broadly-phrased and open-ended.
As indicated by many provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is an important part of our constitutional tradi-
tion that limitations on governmental power designed
to protect individual rights are often broadly-phrased and
open-ended. This tradition is reflected in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It cannot be doubted that the framers' primary con-
cern in the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the
newly-emancipated blacks. But it would not be consis-
tent with our constitutional tradition to so qualify a very
significant limitation on governmental power, which the
Fourteenth Amendment certainly was intended to be. In
our constitutional tradition,
limitations on governmental
power designed to protect in-
dividual rights generally have
been expressed in universal
A terms, rather than restricted
to protection of a particular
group. So, even though its
framers were primarily con-
cerned with preventing dis-
crimination against blacks,
the Fourteenth Amendment,
consistent with this aspect of
our constitutional tradition,
was phrased in majestic gen-
eralities and universal protections. The framers meant
what they said: All persons are entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws.5
The third salient feature of the Constitution is that
it is a constitution "intended to endure." The framers
deliberately made the Constitution very difficult to
amend,6 and apart from the ten amendments of the Bill
of Rights, promulgated virtually contemporaneously
with the original Constitution, there have been only 16
other amendments in 200 years of constitutional history.7
All in all, the Constitution has survived for 200 years
with relatively little change, exactly as the framers in-
tended. As Chief Justice Marshall observed long ago, our
Constitution is one that is "intended to endure for ages
to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs. '"8
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Let me now relate the salient features of the Con-
stitution - it emanates from the People, it contains
sweeping limitations on governmental power to protect
individual rights, it is intended to endure - to the cur-
rent controversy over the "proper" way the courts should
be interpreting the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution.
One view, popularly referred to as "strict construc-
tion" or "interpretivism," is that the courts, in deter-
mining the constitutionality of governmental action af-
fecting individual rights, cannot properly go beyond
values that were "constitutionalized" by the framers, in
the sense that they are "fairly inferable from the Con-
stitution itself." 9 As Robert Bork puts it succinctly:
"Courts must accept any value choice the Legislature
makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made
in the framing of the Constitution." 10
Under this view, for example, the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause would be limited
to protecting against racial and national origin discrim-
ination; it could not properly be relied on to invalidate
other forms of group discrimination such as on the basis
of sex, or general classifications contained in legislation.
Similarly, the due process clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments would have only a "procedural"
component, and could not properly be relied on to in-
validate "substantive" legislation such as that pro-
hibiting abortions, as did the Supreme Court decision
in Roe v Wade.-
A major tenet of the interpretivist provision is that
judicial review is inconsistent with representative demo-
cracy, and so should not go beyond implementing values
clearly constitutionalized by the framers in the text of
the Constitution.
The opposite view, popularly referred to as "liberal
construction" or "non-interpretivism," is that in con-
stitutional adjudication, the courts may properly go
beyond values purportedly constitutionalized by the
framers; they may rely on values that have been judici-
ally infused into the broadly-phrased and open-ended
provisions of the Constitution as the basis for invalidat-
ing governmental action.1 2 This approach to determin-
ing the meaning of the individual rights provisions of
the Constitution is justified on the ground that it serves
a very important and necessary function in our constitu-
tional system, and that is not inconsistent with the gen-
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eral intention of the framers in promulgating the Con-
stitution's individual rights provisions.
I have elsewhere analyzed what has been called the
"legitimacy debate" and concluded that the debate is
futile, because "each side disputes the underlying prem-
ises on which the position of the other side is based.'13
What is not disputed, however, is that the Supreme Court
regularly engages in "non-interpretivist" review, and it
is this "judicial activism" and "value infusion" that is
the crux of the current controversy.1 4
I have elsewhere developed the proposition that
"non-interpretivist" review is "not only legitimate, but
is also a necessary postulate for constitutional adjudica-
tion under our constitutional system.' '15 Without fully
repeating that analysis here, I will try to justify "non-
interpretivist" review by relating it to the salient features
of the Constitution.
First, because the Constitution emanates from the
"People of the United States," the alleged inconsisten-
cy between "non-interpretivist" review and represen-
tative democracy is somewhat diminished. The concept
of the "People of the United States," is vital. The "Peo-
ple of the United States" have through their Constitu-
tion imposed sweeping limitations, designed to protect
individual rights, on the exercise of governmental power.
In our constitutional system, the "People of the United
States" are "supreme" and their wishes, expressed in
the Constitution, take precedence over the wishes of a
majority of the people in a particular part of the United
States, such as a state or locality. Similarly, their wishes,
as expressed in this Constitution which is "intended to
endure," also take precedence over the wishes of a major-
ity of the people at any particular time, as they may be
expressed in an Act of Congress.
The Constitution, as we have said, is not addressed
simply to the courts. It is addressed to all branches of
the federal government, and to state and local govern-
ment. In theory, at least, all governmental bodies should
take account of the Constitution and should not enact
laws or take any action that is reasonably believed to be
violative of the Constitution.
But all too often this is not what happens. A govern-
mental body acts in accordance with what it thinks to
be the wishes or best interests of its constituency, and
is not concerned about the limitations on governmental
power, designed to protect individual rights, that the
"People of the United States" placed in the Constitution.
Be that as it may, ever since Marbury v Madison,
the Supreme Court has held that one function of the
federal judiciary is to define the meaning of the Con-
stitution. This has been fully accepted not only by the
other branches of the federal government and by the
states, but in the final analysis by the "People of the
United States."16 To the extent that in interpreting the
Constitution the Court invalidates actions of political
majorities in particular parts of the country or at a par-
ticular point in time, it is enforcing limitations on
governmental power that the "People of the United0'
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States," as a collectivity, embodied in their Constitu-
tion. Surely performance of this function by the federal
judiciary can cause no great injury to the principle of
representative democracy.
The proponents of "interpretivism" would pro-
bably not disagree with the above proposition, but
would argue that if the Court is to enforce limitations
embodied in the Constitution of the United States, it
should not go beyond values that the framers -
representing the "People of the United States" - are
deemed to have constitutionalized in the text. My
response ties together the other two salient features of
the Constitution: That it contains sweeping limitations
on governmental power designed to protect individual
rights, and that these limitations are contained in a Con-
stitution that is "intended to endure."
Even if it could be said that the framers intended
to "constitutionalize" values - which certainly may
be disputed 17 - it is also clear that the framers intend-
ed the individual rights provisions of the Constitution
to operate as a continuing limitation on governmental
power "for the ages to come." In other words, these pro-
visions must operate as a continuing limitation on gov-
ernmental power in contemporary society.
Since many of the Constitution's limitations on
governmental power are broadly-phrased and open-
ended, they cannot operate effectively in contemporary
society to limit governmental power if their meaning
is determined solely or even primarily with reference
to values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers
at some time in the distant past. So, even if it could be
said that the framers did intend to constitutionalize
values, the Court does not act improperly when it goes
beyond those values to make a constitutional provision
fully operable as a limitation on governmental power
in contemporary society.
Consider, for example, the due process clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Its terms are broad
and open-ended: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law."
In determining the meaning of the due process clause,
the "interpretivists" focus on the word, "process," and
say that the framers of the due process clause intended
to constitutionalize only "process" values, not "sub-
stantive" values. Assume, arguendo, that from a his-
torical standpoint this position is correct, 18 and that the
framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments took
those clauses to mean that the government could not
interfere with liberty and property interests except by
means that satisfied the value of "procedural fairness."
But the text of the due process clause also embodies
the strong concern that "life, liberty and property" be
protected "forever" against improper governmental in-
terference. The framers' concern with "procedural fair-
ness" was not for its own sake but as a means to an end,
namely the protection of liberty and property interests.
They could not have contemplated the sweeping eco-
nomic and social regulation of a later era. When such
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regulation created what the Court saw as a threat to lib-
erty and property interests, the due process clause re-
mained as a textual limitation on governmental power.
At that point the Court, performing its function of defin-
ing the meaning of the Constitution, could properly
focus on the framers' objective in promulgating the due
process clause rather than on what the framers sup-
posedly thought was necessary to implement their ob-
jective at a much earlier time.
What the Court has done, in order to protect liber-
ty and property interests in contemporary society, is to
impute a substantive meaning to the concept of due
process, and to hold that certain kinds of laws and
governmental action interfering with particular liberty
and property interests violate due process. As a result,
the due process clause is fully operable as a limitation
on governmental power in contemporary society, pro-
tecting against what the Court considers improper in-
terference with liberty and property interests.1 9
The same analysis can be made with respect to other
broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of the Con-
stitution, such as the equal protection clause. Since the
equal protection clause by its terms guarantees the
"equal protection of the laws" to all persons, when con-
temporary notions of equality render intolerable a wide-
spread system of legal distinctions based solely on
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gender, the Court may properly interpret the equal pro-
tection clause as invalidating such distinctions.20
We have, then, a "people's constitution," contain-
ing sweeping limitations on governmental power, de-
signed to protect individual rights, and a constitution
"intended to endure." It is the function of the Supreme
Court in our constitutional system to define the mean-
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